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Introduction 
Despite a variety of critiques (e.g., de Waal 1999; Sober 1998, 2005; Fitzpatrick 2008; 
Andrews and Huss 2014; Meketa 2014; Starzak forthcoming), the principle known as 
Morgan’s Canon retains a significant hold on modern scientific and philosophical 
discussions of non-human animal (henceforth, “animal”) cognition and behavior. 
Proposed by the late nineteenth century British philosopher-psychologist, Conwy Lloyd 
Morgan—generally regarded as the “father” of modern comparative psychology—it 
states that: 
 
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher 
psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one 
which stands lower in the psychological scale. (Morgan 1894: 53)  
 
Morgan saw this principle as necessary for scientifically rigorous investigation into the 
minds of animals. It went on to exert enormous influence on the subsequent development 
of comparative psychology, though not always in ways consistent with Morgan’s original 
intent (Costall 1993; Thomas 1998; Fitzpatrick and Goodrich forthcoming). 
 My focus will be on how Morgan’s Canon has been interpreted and applied by 
psychologists and philosophers since Morgan’s day, particularly over the last few 
decades, and whether or not it should continue to be accepted as a fundamental guiding 
principle for the study of animal cognition and behavior—to which the answer will be an 
emphatic “no”. However, one problem with discussing the place of the Canon in the 
contemporary literature is that it has been explicated and interpreted in several different 
ways. The distinctions between these different versions of the Canon have not been fully 
appreciated, even in the most careful discussions. I’ll first distinguish between four 
formulations the Canon that one can find explicitly or implicitly in the literature. I’ll then 
argue that each of these canons is unjustified and unnecessary. We will see that 
comparative psychology has absolutely no need for Morgan’s Canon, on any of its 
current interpretations, and that the field would be better served by an alternative 
principle that I call Evidentialism (Fitzpatrick 2008). 
 
Four Canons 
Morgan’s Canon remains widely accepted primarily because it is seen as a bulwark 
against a natural bias of human beings towards explaining animal behavior in terms of 
sophisticated, human-like cognitive capacities, when the relevant behavior might in fact 
be the product of much less sophisticated causes. Morgan himself criticized the tendency 
of his contemporaries to reflexively attribute instances of animal learning, such as a dog 
learning to open a latched gate using its nose, to a sophisticated faculty of “reason” (e.g., 
an abstract conceptual understanding of the workings of the latch), when the behavior 
might be the product of a much less sophisticated process of trial and error (where the 
animal merely forms an association between a given action and achieving a desired 
outcome). Such a bias, it is argued, still afflicts modern discussions of animal 
intelligence, particularly in the popular media, but also in parts of the scientific literature. 
The Canon serves as a counterweight, ensuring that researchers don’t overestimate the 
capacities of animals. But if this is the problem the Canon is meant to cure, exactly what 
treatment is it meant to provide? 
The strongest formulation in the literature has the most tenuous relationship to 
Morgan’s original words, but was the interpretation that became most prevalent in the 
decades after Morgan proposed the principle (Costall 1993; Thomas 1998). Though, as 
stated, Morgan’s Canon admits for the possibility of accepting “higher” explanations of 
behavior, given appropriate evidence (see also Morgan 1903: 59), some interpreted it as 
banning entirely what are derisively referred to as “anthropomorphic” explanations of 
behavior. This is the Prohibitive Canon. 
Here, the terms “higher” and “lower” are synonymous with “cognitive” and “non-
cognitive”, respectively. The idea is that cognitive explanations of behavior—ones that 
invoke internal mental states such as thoughts, beliefs, emotions, desires, or other 
representational states and processes—are to be viewed with inherent suspicion, because 
they are “anthropomorphic”. Since anthropomorphism is to be avoided at all costs, 
animal behavior is always to be explained without reference to such things. Such was the 
attitude of the behaviorist movement in the early decades of the twentieth century, some 
of whom co-opted Morgan as their intellectual forefather and presented the Canon in this 
light. Here is a textbook rendition from this period: 
 
In Morgan’s case, the principle amounted to this. Where there is a pattern of 
animal behavior which must be explained, both as to form and to origin, and in 
the simplest, but at the same time, most adequate way, the experimenter should 
appeal to factors observable in the situation in which the animal has been placed, 
in the behavior itself, and in the machinery by which the behavior is made 
possible. It is not incumbent on him to pass over these factors in order to appeal to 
a verbal construct, to a mind, or to any other kind of mental factor which lies 
outside of, behind, or within the behavior-situation. (Griffith 1943: 322) 
 
As the popularity of behaviorism has receded and cognitive approaches have become 
widely accepted, the Prohibitive Canon is much less popular than it once was, but one can 
still find researchers advocating something very close to it. Clive Wynne (2007) is 
perhaps the most prominent contemporary defender of a categorical “anti-mentalism” (as 
he refers to it), though Wynne is careful to distinguish his view from the historical 
Morgan. 
Today, the most common articulations of the Canon are not flatly prohibitive, but 
rather correspond to what I want to call the Conservative Canon. For example: 
 
[I]f principles of associative learning or habit formation operating on a primary 
representation may account for putative metacognition data, then it would be 
inappropriate to explain such data based on metacognition (i.e., based on a 
secondary representation); the burden of proof favors primary representations, by 
application of Morgan’s canon… (Crystal and Foote 2009: 2)  
 Following the principle of parsimony, also known as Morgan’s Cannon or 
Ockham’s Razor, we should prefer the simplest explanation for pointing and the 
reaction to it. A reaction without insight seems to be a simpler explanation than 
with insight. Of course, one has to keep an open mind for data that justify more 
complex interpretations for pointing behavior and the reaction to it than the 
interpretation without insight. (van Rooijen 2010: e8) 
 
Here, the terms “higher” and “lower” are generally understood in terms of degrees of 
cognitive sophistication. For instance, purely physiological explanations of behavior—
e.g., in terms of reflexes or innate releasing mechanisms—and other non-cognitive 
explanations—e.g., in terms of the most basic forms of associative conditioning—are to 
be understood as “lower” than cognitive explanations, such as those that involve some 
form of means-end reasoning, say. Moreover, explanations in terms of first-order 
cognitive processes are to be regard as “lower” than those in terms of more sophisticated 
higher-order processes, such as the ability to reason about one’s own mental states (meta-
cognition) or those of others (mind-reading). As the second passage above illustrates, this 
notion of cognitive sophistication is often dressed up in the language of simplicity, where 
explanations in terms of less sophisticated processes are taken to be “simpler” or more 
“parsimonious” than those in terms of more sophisticated ones. Crucially, this principle 
allows that “higher”—i.e., relatively cognitively sophisticated—explanations of behavior 
can potentially be accepted. However, when we have a choice between more cognitively 
sophisticated and less cognitively sophisticated explanations, we should adopt the least 
sophisticated explanation available. The Conservative Canon can thus be viewed as a 
decision principle, which tells us how to choose between competing explanations for 
behavior: we should always default to the least cognitively sophisticated explanation 
consistent with the available data.i 
Though most explicit presentations of the Canon can be seen as instances of the 
Conservative Canon, many advocates don't actually follow it in practice. Instead, what 
they often seem to abide by is a weaker principle that I want to call the Restraining 
Canon. The distinction between these two principles coincides with a largely ignored 
ambiguity in Morgan’s original framing of the Canon. When Morgan says that we 
shouldn’t endorse higher explanations for behavior when lower ones are available, are we 
to actively endorse the relevant lower explanation, or are we to merely withhold judgment 
until future evidence enables us to decide between the respective higher and lower 
explanations? Morgan actually equivocated on this, sometimes using the Canon to defend 
lower accounts of behavior, sometimes urging us to merely withhold acceptance from a 
higher account, given the availability of a lower one (compare Morgan 1894: 248, 302, 
370). In contrast to the Conservative Canon, then, the Restraining Canon doesn’t say that 
we should automatically endorse the lower explanation when higher and lower accounts 
are consistent with the available behavioral data. Rather, it says that when a lower 
explanation is available, we must not accept a higher one. We should be especially 
retrained in our endorsement of higher explanations, being sure to eliminate lower 
explanations before accepting them. Here are some examples that seem to be consistent 
with this weaker formulation: 
 
[I]t is our intention to highlight the principle enshrined in Morgan’s Canon; 
namely that accounts of animal behavior in terms of higher-order mental functions 
should only be accepted when explanations in terms of simpler mechanisms are 
unavailable. (Dwyer and Burgess 2011: 361) 
 
…we must not abandon Morgan’s canon. For example, we should not accept the 
idea that honey-bees have such capacities before eliminating every other 
possibility. (Manning and Dawkins 1998: 297) 
 
The final interpretation of the Canon that I want to discuss is the Cautionary 
Canon. I’ve not seen it stated explicitly, but it does capture a possible way thinking about 
the role of the Canon in modern comparative psychology. In contrast to the three just 
discussed, this Canon is not really a methodological principle at all. It doesn’t give any 
specific methodological guidance; it is just a cautionary exhortation—the sort of thing 
that professors pound into the heads of their students in introductory lectures, but not a 
principle to be employed in actual research. It just serves to emphasize that the history of 
research into animal cognition has been marred by cases—the infamous case of Clever 
Hans, for instance—where researchers leapt too quickly to higher-level accounts of 
animal behavior, without adequately considering the possibility of lower-level processes 
being at work. In this respect, the Canon is merely a pedagogical tool, reminding future 
researchers not to make the same mistakes as their forebears. 
 
The Prohibitive Canon 
The categorical anti-cognitivism embodied in the Prohibitive Canon has received much 
criticism (Allen and Bekoff 1997; Keeley 2004; Andrews 2015), so I won't rehearse all 
the arguments against it. The key point is that labelling cognitive explanations of non-
human behavior “anthropomorphic,” where is this is understood as a conceptual or 
inferential mistake, just begs the question by assuming that cognitive processes are 
uniquely human. It is surely an empirical question whether such processes exist in other 
species; not something that can be resolved by methodological fiat. 
Of course, anti-cognitivists usually assert that internal mental processes in other 
species cannot be studied scientifically, because they are intrinsically unobservable or 
because we cannot describe them in a way that isn't inextricably tied to human language 
and concepts (Blumberg and Wasserman 1995; Wynne 2007). The first claim forgets that 
unobservable theoretical entities are a common component of modern science generally 
(consider quarks and Higgs bosons), while the second ignores the fact that modern 
cognitivists typically assume a broadly functionalist perspective, according to which 
mental states and processes are defined by their characteristic functional or causal roles. 
Crucially, such definitions can be seen as analogous to (and no more anthropomorphic 
than) the causal-role definitions that physicists provide for things like Higgs bosons. Just 
as physicists can legitimately posit the existence of such unobservable theoretical entities 
in order to explain things that we do observe, so cognitivists can legitimately posit the 
existence of a kind of episodic memory in scrub jays, say, (understood as the capacity to 
store and utilise information about “what” events occurred “where” and “when”) in order 
to explain their observable behavior (e.g., Clayton and Dickinson 1998). 
In short, there is no reason whatsoever to think that cognitive states and processes 
cannot be attributed to animals in a scientifically legitimate manner, and hence no reason 
to prohibit such attributions. 
 
The Conservative Canon 
Here is a typical presentation of the Conservative Canon: 
  
Unless clear evidence is provided that a more complex cognitive process has been 
used, C. Lloyd Morgan’s famous canon of parsimony obliges us to assume that it 
has not; we must then conclude that a simpler learning process can account for the 
learning. (Wasserman and Zentall 2006: 4). 
 
Suppose we are concerned with how an animal learns to perform a particular task. We 
consider various types of learning process that can account for the observed behavior—
e.g., basic associative learning versus a more sophisticated form of means-end 
reasoning—but we are unable to turn up decisive evidence that discriminates between 
them. Wasserman and Zentall would appear to have us “conclude” that it must therefore 
be the lower, associative learning process at work. But what is the status of this 
conclusion? Are proponents of associative learning to declare victory and the field to 
move on to some new topic? That hardly seems appropriate, and I seriously doubt that 
most of those who espouse something like the Conservative Canon would recommend 
such a verdict. So, what exactly are we to take away from a case like this? Perhaps the 
conclusion that it is the lower learning process at work and the higher one is absent is just 
a provisional one, to be accepted pending future research into the matter? That sounds 
better, but notice how unempirical it is. We are to accept, albeit provisionally, an 
associative learning explanation, not because it is better supported by the data, but 
because the data does not discriminate between it and one that invokes a more 
sophisticated process.  
 Crucially, the usual rationale offered for Morgan’s Canon—the supposed 
tendency to attribute sophisticated cognitive processes to animals on the basis of 
insufficient evidence, or without proper attention being paid to alternative, less 
cognitively sophisticated explanations—actually undercuts this aspect of the 
Conservative Canon. Why is it an appropriate response to this problem to enshrine a 
default bias towards lower explanations? That seems like overkill, given that one could 
just remain neutral if there is insufficient evidence to decide between higher and lower 
explanations. Moreover, if over-attribution of cognitive sophistication to animals is an 
error that needs to be corrected, then so is under-attribution (de Waal 1999; Sober 2005; 
Andrews and Huss 2014). The Conservative Canon clearly increases the chance of 
making the latter error: it asks us to always favor the least cognitively sophisticated 
explanation, even when there is no empirical reason to do so. Hence, the logic thought to 
motivate Morgan’s Canon actually runs against the Conservative Canon. 
I think this is one reason why many that express the Conservative Canon don't 
actually abide by it in practice. However, there clearly are researchers genuinely 
committed to the principle. Carruthers (2008) argues that the existing experimental 
results that supposedly indicate meta-cognitive capacities in animals can be explained in 
terms of purely first-order processes. Hence, “we should, at present, refuse to attribute 
meta-cognitive processes to animals. This inference is grounded in an application of 
Morgan’s Canon” (2008: 59). While this might sound like an instance of the Restraining 
Canon, Carruthers’ position isn’t one of agnosticism. Though he remains open to the 
possibility of future work establishing the existence of meta-cognition in animals, the 
“inference” he refers to is to the (at least provisional) conclusion that such capacities are 
in fact absent. This is an example of what I call “armchair denialism”, where the mere 
ability to construct a hypothetical lower explanation for the relevant behavioral data is 
enough not only to suggest that the higher explanation shouldn’t be accepted—or that the 
relevant experiments might not show what they are claimed to show—but that the lower 
one should be accepted instead. It is worth considering, then, what justification, if any, 
can be given for the Conservative Canon. 
As we’ve seen, expressions of the Conservative Canon usually also include the 
claim that explanations in terms of less sophisticated cognitive processes are somehow 
“simpler” or more “parsimonious”. Hence, the alternative to justifying the Conservative 
Canon in terms of concerns about over-attribution is to argue that it is just a special case 
of Ockham’s Razor—the general rule of scientific method that simpler explanations 
ought to be preferred to more complex ones, other things being equal. 
This appeal to simplicity is problematic on many levels, however (see also 
Mikhalevich this volume). We shouldn’t just take it for granted that it is a legitimate rule 
of scientific method that simpler theories or explanations are to be preferred, other things 
being equal. Though many scientists do espouse principles like Ockham’s Razor, it is far 
from clear that simplicity really does play a significant role in theory evaluation, and it is 
certainly not a trivial problem to explain why it is reasonable to choose between rival 
theories on such grounds. I am sympathetic to Sober’s (1994, 2015) claim that when 
considerations of simplicity appear to play a legitimate role in science, it is typically 
some other consideration that does the real epistemic work (Fitzpatrick 2009, 2015). 
In any case, why should we regard explanations in terms of less sophisticated 
processes as necessarily simpler? Even if one accepts that the level of cognitive 
sophistication attributed can be regarded as one way in which rival psychological theories 
might be evaluated for their comparative simplicity, there are multiple other ways of 
assessing relative simplicity, many of which conflict with the recommendations of the 
Conservative Canon. Morgan (1894: 54-55) himself argued that the Canon ran against a 
preference for simplicity because it was generally simpler to explain animal behavior in 
the same way as one would explain similar behavior in a human being. Similarly, as 
Sober (2005) and de Waal (1999) point out, considerations of evolutionary parsimony—
minimizing the number of independent evolutionary changes that have to be posited—can 
sometimes favor attributing higher processes to animals, if, for instance, this enables us to 
explain the emergence of similar behaviors in humans and a closely related primate 
species, say, with the evolution of a single higher cognitive mechanism in a common 
ancestor of both species, rather than the independent evolution of two different 
mechanisms. In addition, an explanation that attributes more sophisticated learning 
capacities to an animal might be said to “simpler” than an associative learning 
explanation, if the latter requires us to make more assumptions about the animal’s 
previous experiences with the relevant task. Hence, whatever one thinks about the 
legitimacy of appeals to simplicity in comparative psychology, there are many different 
ways of measuring the relative “simplicity” of behavioral explanations. Given that the 
Conservative Canon prioritizes one particular kind of simplicity—level of cognitive 
sophistication—over others, we need another justification, aside from a completely 
general appeal to simplicity, for the Conservative Canon. 
 Shettleworth (2012: 12-13) suggests that the Canon makes sense insofar as it 
leads us to prefer explaining behavior in terms of lower processes—“habituation and 
classical conditioning”, for instance—that we already know are widely distributed in the 
animal kingdom, rather than in terms of more sophisticated processes that are likely to be 
much rarer in nature. Similarly, Carruthers (2008: 59) argues that it makes sense to 
default to a purely first-order explanation of the putative meta-cognition data, given the 
plausible rarity of meta-cognitive capacity in nature, which follows from the fact it 
requires that first-order reasoning is already in place and because it is “extremely 
cognitive demanding.” The idea seems to be that, given that lower processes are more 
common in nature, the antecedent probability of lower explanations is greater than that 
for higher explanations. 
However, Shettleworth’s claim seems to beg the question, since it is not entirely 
clear what role associative learning, as she understands it, plays in explaining animal 
behavior (Meketa 2014). Researchers like Randy Gallistel (2000) have long been arguing 
that traditional models of associative learning can’t even explain the results of standard 
classical and operant conditioning experiments, which are better accounted for by much 
richer information-processing models. Much the same is true in Carruthers’ case. Even if 
he is right that meta-cognition is particularly cognitively demanding, research into this 
capacity is at such an early stage that we just have no idea how widely distributed this 
capacity is likely to be in the animal kingdom—it might turn out to be quite widely 
distributed because it confers peculiar evolutionary advantage. Moreover, Carruthers’ 
argument loses its force when we consider primates closely related to humans, who are 
surely more likely to possess such a rare capacity, given their evolutionary proximity to a 
species known to have it. 
To be clear, there are cases where relevant background information about the 
species in question—level of neurological complexity, type of ecological niche, 
information about closely related species, etc.—may legitimately lead us to elevate the 
antecedent probability of particular lower explanations relative to higher ones. Meta-
cognition probably is too demanding for the tiny brains of fruit flies, for instance. 
However, the Conservative Canon enshrines a completely general preference for lower 
over higher. That it may sometimes be reasonable to favor lower over higher is not 
sufficient to justify such a blanket bias. Indeed, the fact that the antecedent probability of 
having particular psychological capacities is different for different species constitutes 
reason to reject the Conservative Canon, since the principle does not take that into 
account. 
Aside from such justificatory problems, the blanket bias towards lower 
explanations enshrined in the Conservative Canon is also demonstrably pernicious in 
terms of its actual and likely effects on the conduct of research (see also Mikhalevich this 
volume). Consider Gallistel’s claims again. Associative learning hypotheses are often the 
first port of call for skeptics about sophisticated cognition in animals. Consequently, 
experimentalists (quite rightly) try to devise experiments capable of ruling out such 
hypotheses. However, one of the effects of associative learning occupying the position of 
being the default hypothesis is that comparative psychologists have generally adopted a 
distinctly uncritical attitude toward the process, assuming it to be a pervasive domain-
general process, capable of explaining a very wide range of seemingly complex 
behaviors, but which requires little cognitive sophistication. However, if Gallistel is right, 
this seems to have largely just been taken for granted. That is what happens when certain 
types of hypothesis win by default: the nature and actual explanatory power of such 
hypotheses receives very little critical scrutiny. 
Moreover, consider the effects of all researchers actually abiding by the 
Conservative Canon—i.e., accepting or at least preferring the lowest explanation 
consistent with the available data in all possible areas of inquiry. This could be 
potentially extremely damaging, insofar as it would discourage researchers from taking 
seriously the idea that particular species may possess cognitive capacities more 
sophisticated than deemed necessary by an application of the Canon to the existing data. 
Discoveries in science often come when scientists actively pursue bold and provocative 
hypotheses that can’t initially be demonstrated empirically. Von Frisch’s famous work on 
the honeybee dance language provides an important example of this (Fitzpatrick 2008). 
The idea that honey bees actively communicate information to each other about the 
location and quality of foraging sites was not something that von Frisch could empirically 
establish until after decades of patient investigation, and there certainly were less 
cognitively sophisticated explanations for bee foraging behavior that didn’t involve 
communication available throughout this period—for instance, that bees merely follow 
the scent given off by returning foragers. Indeed, I suspect that this remarkable 
communication system might not have been discovered had von Frisch abided by the 
Conservative Canon and accepted the lowest explanation that was available at the 
beginning of his investigations. 
 
The Restraining Canon 
Given these problems with the Conservative Canon, the Restraining Canon seems much 
more appropriate. This Canon does not state that lower explanations automatically win 
when they are available. Rather, it urges that we withhold endorsement from a higher 
explanation when a lower one can be offered. Initially, this seems thoroughly reasonable, 
and I suspect it is what many apparent advocates of the Conservative Canon really have 
in mind. Nonetheless, the Restraining Canon is highly problematic. 
The first problem concerns the conditions under which higher explanations can be 
accepted. The strongest version of the principle would require that it be impossible to 
explain the relevant behavior in lower terms. This is clearly too strong. Scientists are 
almost never in a position to conclusively rule out all alternative explanations, no matter 
how well a series of experiments has been designed. The most one can hope for is to 
render alternative hypotheses implausible relative to the candidate hypothesis. Deciding 
between rival explanations for empirical data—especially behavioral data—is typically a 
matter of determining the balance of plausibility, rather than a strict process of 
elimination. Nonetheless, there do seem to some researchers that employ the Canon in 
such a strong fashion, demanding that advocates of higher processes produce data that 
cannot possibly be interpreted in any other way (e.g., Povinelli and Vonk 2003). Such 
demands are both excessive and distract from what is really at stake, which is weighing 
the overall balance of evidence (Fitzpatrick 2009; Andrews 2015). 
 There is a more fundamental problem with the Restraining Canon, however. The 
core idea is that higher explanations ought to face the burden proof in order to counteract 
our supposed bias toward cognitively sophisticated accounts of animal behavior. 
According to one recent defence of the Canon: 
 
Adherence to the canon forces one to dig deeper when designing experiments and 
devising theories, and, in doing so, Morgan’s canon pressures comparative 
psychologists to produce better science. (Karin D’Arcy 2005: 197) 
 
But why should comparative psychologists be “pressured” in only one direction? Karin 
D’Arcy writes as if only higher explanations can be endorsed erroneously, focusing on 
the tendency to project human folk psychology onto other creatures. Yet, comparative 
psychologists can fall prey to all sorts of inferential biases, not all of which lead to 
attributions of higher processes. The history of twentieth century comparative psychology 
demonstrates that researchers are just as capable of accepting lower explanations without 
sufficient evidence. It was once widely taken for granted that all animal behavior can be 
explained in terms of classical or operant conditioning, not because this enjoyed direct 
empirical support, because of a compulsion, motivated by spurious concerns about 
“anthropomorphism”, to adopt the least cognitively sophisticated account of animal 
behavior one could imagine. These scientists also needed to “dig deeper” and “produce 
better science.” 
If the problem Karin D’Arcy and other advocates of the Canon are concerned with 
is researchers endorsing explanations of animal behavior without due attention being paid 
to alternatives, we can see that the asymmetry built into the Restraining Canon is quite 
inappropriate as a response. This is as much a problem with respect to lower explanations 
as higher ones; yet, the Restraining Canon places the focus only on higher explanations. 
Instead, the following sort of principle, which I call Evidentialism, would much better 
serve the field: 
 
In no case should we endorse an explanation of animal behavior in terms of 
cognitive process X on the basis of the available evidence if that evidence gives 
us no reason to prefer it to an alternative explanation in terms of a different 
cognitive process Y—whether this be lower or higher on the ‘psychological 
scale’. (Fitzpatrick 2008: 242) 
 
This principle urges us to always be mindful of alternative explanations, be these 
cognitively more or less sophisticated than the one that is being advanced, and only 
endorse a given explanation when one is able to show that that explanation, whatever it 
is, is better supported by the available evidence than the alternatives—“evidence,” here 
needn’t just be behavioral evidence, but may include any information relevant to 
assessing the evidential status of a given psychological hypothesis. 
I don’t deny that advocates of higher processes sometimes fail to pay adequate 
attention to lower-level alternatives when accounting for the results of particular 
experiments. In this respect, researchers do need to “dig deep” and try to design 
experiments that can provide differential evidence for higher processes, if they are 
present, but we don’t need the Restraining Canon to remind them to do that. As Sober 
(2005: 97) has put it, the only “prophylactic” we need for the kinds of inferential errors 
and biases that Morgan’s Canon has been thought to control for is “empiricism.” 
Crucially, Evidentialism captures whatever genuine methodological benefits can be 
brought with the Restraining Canon, but doesn’t enshrine the problematic asymmetry that 
is built into that principle, which places the focus exclusively on higher explanations. 
That asymmetry is both completely unjustified by the genuine concerns highlighted by 
advocates of the Canon and pernicious, in so far as it distracts away from parallel 
concerns about systematically underestimating the cognitive capacities of animals. 
 
The Cautionary Canon 
This leaves us with the Cautionary Canon. On this interpretation, the Canon shouldn’t be 
seen as offering any specific methodological advice; rather, it serves to remind students 
of the chequered history of animal cognition research, and urges them not to make the 
same mistakes as their forebears. The problems I have identified with the other Canons 
might then be seen as a product of taking the Canon out this pedagogical context. 
This is fine, as far as it goes. To some extent, the Canon has been useful as a 
pedagogical instrument, and Morgan should continue to be remembered as a pivotal 
figure in the history of comparative psychology for pointing out the errors of much early 
work in the field—though the tendency of modern researchers focus exclusively on the 
Canon has obscured many of his key contributions (Fitzpatrick and Goodrich 
forthcoming). However, the asymmetric focus on attributions of sophisticated cognitive 
capacities to animals remains problematic, and the general absence of parallel cautionary 
exhortations about how researchers can go astray when it comes to denying the presence 
of sophisticated cognitive capacities in animals has, in my view, been extremely 
damaging to the conduct of research in comparative psychology. Hence, the key message 
should really be what one finds in Evidentialism. It is this, not Morgan’s Canon, that 
should be pounded into the heads of future generations of researchers. 
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i Some critics have seen the very notion of a psychological scale as problematic, particularly if it is 
anchored (as it was in Morgan’s case) to the notion of an evolutionary scale, where “higher” processes are 
taken to represent a higher stage of evolutionary development. I will not consider such concerns here, 
except to say that I think that modern interpretations of the Canon can be separated from an evolutionary 
scale, and that the notion of cognitive sophistication I have described is best understood in functional terms 
(Fitzpatrick 2008). 
